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All God's Creatures: Reading Genesis on Human and Non-human Animals 
 
The Christian tradition has barely begun reading Genesis after Darwin. We no longer 
read Genesis 1 with a pre-Copernican worldview, thinking our planet to be the centre 
of the universe. Most of us are happy to read the text as congruent with scientific 
theories of the origins of the universe in a big bang. But we continue to be resolutely 
pre-Darwinian in our reading of the creation narratives. We are still operating with 
understandings of the relationship between human beings and other creatures that are 
based on Aristotelian rather than Darwinian theories of the natural world. And our 
hermeneutics similarly and stubbornly refuse to acknowledge the consequences of 
recognizing that we are part of the created order, rather than suspended above it as 
some part-creature, part-divine hybrid. In this paper I will argue for the theological 
necessity of displacing the anthropocentric readings of Genesis that have become 
Christian orthodoxy and therefore to begin again the project of reading Genesis after 
Darwin with particular reference to our understanding of the relationship between 
human beings and other living things. In conclusion I will gesture towards the 
consequences of this project for central themes of Christian doctrine.1 
                                                
1 I do not, of course, mean to claim that I am anything close to the first to notice this question. Among 
the many recent works to draw welcome attention to the issue and challenge Feuerbach’s view that 
‘Nature, the world, has no value, no interest for Christians’ (Ludwig Feuerbach, The Essence of 
Christianity, trans. George Eliot (New York: Prometheus Books, 1989), 287) are Charles Birch, and 
 2 
 
An Anthropocentric tradition 
I begin with some orientation in pre-Darwinian readings of Genesis in relation to the 
created order apart from human beings. An  
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interesting place to begin is with the first-century Jewish theologian Philo of 
Alexandria, both because of his influence on later Christian interpreters and because 
the position he outlines broadly characterizes Christian readings of this text until the 
eighteenth century.2 In his text from AD 50, De animalibus (‘On animals’), Philo 
discusses the question of whether animals possess reason. The form of the text is 
dialogic: Philo is in discussion with his apostate nephew Alexander. But the dialogue 
is of a particular kind: the first seventy-six sections of the text, out of a total of one 
hundred sections, is a monologue by Alexander, minutely detailing evidence of the 
purposive and apparently rational behaviour of spiders, bees, swallows, monkeys, 
                                                                                                                                      
Lukas Fischer, Living With the Animals: The Community of God's Creatures, Risk Book Series No.77 
(Geneva: WCC Publications, 1997); Celia Deane-Drummond, The Ethics of Nature, vol. New 
dimensions to religious ethics (Malden, Mass.; Oxford: Blackwell, 2004); Gary A. Kowalski, The Bible 
According to Noah: Theology as if Animals Mattered (New York: Lantern Books, 2001); Andrew 
Linzey, Animal Gospel: Christian Faith as Though Animals Mattered (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 
1998); Andrew Linzey, and Dan Cohn-Sherbok, After Noah: Animals and the Liberation of Theology 
(London: Mowbray, 1997); Andrew Linzey, Creatures of the Same God: Explorations in Animal 
Theology (Winchester: Winchester University Press, 2007); Charles Patterson, Eternal Treblinka: Our 
Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust (New York: Lantern Books, 2002); Paul Waldau, The Specter 
of Speciesism: Buddhist and Christian Views of Animals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); 
Stephen H. Webb, Good Eating (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos Press, 2001); Stephen H Webb, On God 
and Dogs: A Christian Theology of Compassion for Animals (New York; Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1998); Robert N. Wennberg, God, Humans, and Animals: An Invitation to Enlarge Our Moral 
Universe (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2003); Donna Yarri, The Ethics of Animal 
Experimentation: A Critical Analysis and Constructive Christian Proposal (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005). My point is that the standard reading of Genesis as placing human beings in a different 
theological category to the rest of creation persists in spite of this attention. 
2 For a valuable survey of the developments in theological thinking on this issue at the end of this 
period, see Keith Thomas, Man and the Natural World: Changing Attitudes in England 1500–1800 
(London; New York: Penguin, 1984). 
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fawns, elephants, fish, tortoises, falcons — even oysters — alongside many others.3 
The final quarter of the treatise is Philo’s response: a brisk judgement that all these 
things are done naturally by the creatures, rather than by foresight: while their actions 
look similar to those of human beings, they are without thought and the complexity of 
their actions is attributable to the way they are designed, rather than their own 
rationality. He concludes that we should ‘stop criticizing nature and committing 
sacrilege’ because ascribing serious self-restraint to animals ‘is to insult those whom 
nature has endowed with the best part’.4 In his commentary on the text, Abraham 
Terian finds in this conclusion the aim of the treatise: ‘In spite of the title of the 
treatise and the frequent references to animals, the work as a whole is basically 
anthropological’.5 Philo is discussing animals in order to defend the Aristotelian 
distinction between humans and other animals on the basis of reason. 
 When Philo turns to the interpretation of Genesis, he is similarly determinative 
about the qualitative difference between human beings and the rest of creation, this 
time giving it a theological significance. In his treatise on the creation of the world 
(De opificio mundi) he argues that the image of God in human beings is not physical 
but ‘in respect of the Mind, the sovereign element of the soul … for after the pattern 
of a single Mind … the mind in each of those who successively came into being was 
moulded’.6 Later in the same work he asks why human beings were created last 
among the creatures and finds four reasons, each of which makes clear human 
superiority. First, just as the giver of a banquet ensures everything is prepared before 
the guests arrive, so God wanted human beings to experience a ‘banquet and sacred 
display’ of all the things intended for their use and enjoyment. Second, human beings 
were created last so it might be instructive to future generations that God provided 
abundantly for their ancestors. Third, God wanted to unite earth and heaven by 
                                                
3 Philo of Alexandria, De animalibus, trans. Abraham Terian (Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1981). 
4 Philo, De animalibus, §100. 
5 Philo, De animalibus, §112. 
6 Philo, Philo, Loeb Classical Library, vol. I, trans. F. H. Colson and G. H. Whitaker (London: 
Heinemann, 1929), De opificio mundi, §§ 23. 
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making heaven first and human beings last, since human beings are ‘a miniature 
heaven’. Finally, human beings had to arrive last, so that in appearing suddenly before 
the other animals  
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they might be amazed, do homage to their master, and be tamed.7 Philo is no less 
bracing in his Questions and Answers on Genesis. He asks why the animals had to die 
in the flood, given that they are incapable of sin, and provides three answers. First, 
just as when a king is killed in battle, his military forces are struck down with him, so 
God decided that if the king of the animals were struck down, the animals should be 
destroyed too. Second, when a man’s head is cut off, no one complains that the rest of 
the body dies too. Since human beings are the head of the animals, it is not surprising 
that all other living things should be destroyed with him. Third, since the beasts were 
made for the ‘need and honour of man’, once human beings were destroyed, it was 
right for them to be killed too.8 
 Philo’s reading of Genesis in the light of Aristotelian natural philosophy was 
influential for Christian interpretation of the texts, and the qualitative division 
between human beings and other creatures on the basis of reason has set the 
parameters for Christian thought ever since. Augustine, for example, also found the 
image of God in the human mind — though he extends this in a trinitarian mode with 
a division between mind, love and knowledge9 — and thought that the lack of society 
in reason with the animals was grounds for the permissibility of killing them.10 
Aquinas believes God is the last end of the universe, rather than human beings, but it 
                                                
7 Philo, De opificio mundi, §§ 25–28. 
8 Philo, Supplementary Vol. I, trans. F. H. Colson and G. H. Whitaker (London: Heinemann, 1929), bk. 
II, qu. 9. 
9 Augustine, On the Holy Trinity, Philip Schaff (ed.), Nicene and Post Nicene Fathers, Series 1, vol. 3 
(Peabody, MA: Hendrikson, 1995), bk. 9. 
10 Augustine, City of God, trans. R. W. Dyson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), bk. 1, 
ch. 20, 33.  
 5 
is only rational creatures that share fully in this end11 and are made fully in the image 
of God.12 Luther’s commentary on Genesis agrees strikingly with Philo that we can 
discern God’s provident care for humanity in making every part of creation with a 
view to its contribution to a splendid home for human beings.13 Calvin concurs that it 
is understanding and reason that separate human beings from ‘brute animals’, and 
echoes Philo’s judgement that all things were created for the conveniences and 
necessities of human beings.14 In place of Philo’s metaphor of a banquet, Calvin 
pictures creation as a theatre designed so that beholding the wonderful works of God, 
human beings might adore their author.15 Luther and Calvin concur that the image of 
God must be understood as what was original in Adam and restored in Christ, which 
Calvin understands as excellence in everything good, chiefly located in the human 
mind and heart but showing in every part.16 
 If we turn to modern interpreters of Genesis, we find a significant shift in 
understandings of the meaning of the image of God in recognition of inadequacies in 
previous accounts. There is consensus that the attempt to identify particular human 
faculties that image God is misguided: Wenham comments that in every case there is 
suspicion that the commentator is reading their own view about what is most 
significant about  
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11 Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, trans. English Dominican Fathers (London: Burns Oates & 
Washbourne Ltd, 1923), ch. 111–12. 
12 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, trans. Fathers of the English Domincan Province (London: Blackfriars, 
1963), I.93.2. 
13 Martin Luther, Lectures on Genesis, Chapters 1–5, Luther's Works, vol. I, ed. Jaroslav Pelikan (Saint 
Louis: Concordia, 1958), 39. 
14 John Calvin, Genesis, edited and translated by John King (Edinburgh: Banner of Truth Trust, 1965), 
96. 
15 Calvin, Genesis, 64. 
16 Calvin, Genesis, 95. See J. Richard Middleton, The Liberating Image: The Imago Dei in Genesis 1 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos, 2005), 20–21, for a summary of Luther’s and Calvin’s positions. 
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human beings into the text.17 There is also an impressive consensus about how the 
image of God should be interpreted: commentators largely agree that it is the 
democratization of political terminology in a Mesopotamian context in which the king 
is called the image of God.18 While the explanation of the meaning of the image of 
God has been transformed, however, its function in demarcating a decisive division 
between human beings and other creatures remains the same. Brueggemann, for 
example, declaims the privileged status of human beings in terms comparable with 
Philo’s: ‘There is one way in which God is imaged in the world and only one: 
humanness! This is the only creature, the only part of creation, which discloses to us 
something about the reality of God.’19 Brueggemann suggests that God has a 
‘different, intimate relation’ with human beings, with whom God has made a 
‘peculiarly intense commitment’ and to whom God has granted ‘marvellous 
freedom’.20 
While reason has been displaced from the Aristotelian worldview in modern 
accounts as demarcating the line between humans and all other living creatures, 
Brueggemann’s language exemplifies the widespread retention of a view that human 
beings belong in a different theological category to other living things. It is this view 
that I take to be indicative of a reading of Genesis that is pre-Darwinian, for the 
reasons that follow. 
 
                                                
17 Gordon J. Wenham, Genesis (Word Bible Commentary 1-2; Waco: Word, 1987, 1994), vol. 1 30. 
18 See, for example, Wenham, Genesis, 31; Victor P. Hamilton, Genesis (NICOT, 2 vols; Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1990, 1995), vol. 1, 135; Walter Brueggemann, Genesis (Interpretation; Atlanta: 
John Knox, 1982), 32; Gerhard von Rad, Genesis (OTL; rev.ed., London: SCM, 1972), 58; and the 
detailed discussion in Middleton, Liberating Image, 93–145. Westermann is a dissenting voice, 
preferring Barth’s interpretation of the image as counterpart to God: Claus Westermann, Genesis 1-11, 
trans. John J. Scullion (London: SPCK, 1984), 146–58. 
19 Brueggemann, Genesis, 32. 
20 Brueggemann, Genesis, 31. 
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Attempts to reconcile human-separatism and evolution 
Let us call a view (like Brueggemann’s) that places human beings and other living 
things in different theological categories a ‘human-separatist’ view. My question is 
whether a human-separatist can also believe in human evolution: the theory that 
human beings evolved from other living creatures. It seems to me that there are two 
possible ways of reconciling the human-separatist view with belief in human 
evolution.  
First, one could argue that human beings have developed so far beyond any 
other creature as to make them qualitatively different. The main problem with this 
line of argument in general is that it is hard to give content to exactly what constitutes 
this development while retaining its capacity to distinguish between humans and 
animals. For example, Keith Ward defends the Thomist view that human beings are 
the exclusive possessors of rational souls and that this is compatible with human 
evolution: ‘we might say that, when the brain reaches a certain stage of complexity, 
the power of conceptual thought, of reasoning and thinking, begins to exist; and that 
is when a rational soul begins to be’.21 But what are we to understand by rationality 
here? It is commonly linked to capacities such as intelligence, the possession of 
beliefs and desires  
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or autonomy and personhood, but recent studies of non-human species indicate that 
human beings differ from other creatures only in degree in relation to each of these 
                                                
21 Keith Ward, The Battle for the Soul: An Affirmation of Human Dignity and Value (London: Hodder 
and Stoughton, 1985), 53.  
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capacities.22 The task of distinguishing between humans and other living things on the 
basis of rationality is so taxing that some have opted to make the distinction by 
definition: Jonathan Bennett defines rationality as ‘whatever it is that humans possess 
which marks them off, in respect of intellectual capacity, sharply and importantly 
from all other known species’.23 The fact that Bennett is reduced to this strategy 
shows that the hope of a ‘sharp’ and ‘important’ line marking the difference between 
human beings and other species may be a forlorn one. Keith Ward concedes that if 
other living things apart from humans were found to be rational, they would also have 
to be granted the protection offered to humans.24 He fails to account, however, for the 
complexities introduced if rationality is a matter of degree rather than an absolute 
category. 
Other alternatives offered to distinguish reliably between humans and animals, 
such as self-consciousness or language, are similarly found on closer inspection to be 
matters of degree, which some creatures apart from humans possess in part.25 In fact, 
even without the benefit of modern scientific evidence about the intelligence and self-
consciousness of non-human creatures, Charles Darwin set out the key features of an 
argument against the assertion of a qualitative difference between human beings and 
other creatures in 1871, in The Descent of Man: 
Nevertheless the difference in mind between man and the higher animals, 
great as it is, is certainly one of degree and not of kind. We have seen that the 
senses and intuitions, the various emotions and faculties, such as love, 
                                                
22 See the discussion in Donna Yarri, The Ethics of Animal Experimentation: A Critical Analysis and 
Constructive Christian Proposal (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 21–55; Marc Bekoff, 
Minding Animals: Awareness, Emotions, and Heart (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); 
Carolyn A. Ristau (ed.), Cognitive Ethology: The Minds of Other Animals (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates, 1991). 
23 Cited in Yarri, Ethics of Animal Experimentation, 33. 
24 Ward, Battle for the Soul, 152–3. 
25 See Yarri, Ethics of Animal Experimentation, 27–32; 43–49. 
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memory, attention, curiosity, imitation, reason, &c., of which man boasts, may 
be found in an incipient, or even sometimes in a well-developed condition, in 
the lower animals. They are also capable of some inherited improvement, as 
we see in the domestic dog compared with the wolf or jackal. If it be 
maintained that certain powers, such as self-consciousness, abstraction, &c., 
are peculiar to man, it may well be that these are the incidental results of other 
highly-advanced intellectual faculties; and these again are mainly the result of 
the continued use of a highly developed language. At what age does the new-
born infant possess the power of abstraction, or become self-conscious and 
reflect on its own existence? We cannot answer; nor can we answer in regard 
to the ascending organic scale. The half-art and half-instinct of language still 
bears the stamp of its gradual evolution.26  
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One might think it helpful to reach for the aid of emergence theory at this point. For 
example Arthur Peacocke characterizes evolution as a process 
of emergence, for new forms of matter, and a hierarchy of organization of 
these forms, appear in the course of time. These new forms have new 
properties, behaviours and networks of relations which necessitate not only 
specific methods of investigation but also the development of 
epistemologically irreducible concepts in order to describe and refer to them. 
To these new organizations of matter it is, very often, possible to ascribe new 
levels of what can only be called ‘reality’ that is, the epistemology implies at 
                                                
26 Charles Darwin, The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex (London: John Murray, 1871). 
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least a putative ontology. In other words new kinds of reality may be said to 
‘emerge’ over time. Notably, on the surface of the Earth, new forms of living 
matter (that is living organisms) have come into existence by this continuous 
process—that is what we mean by evolution.27 
In the context of trying to find a reliable marker to establish a discontinuity between 
the human and non-human, however, this is all beside the point. My argument here is 
that we lack any identification of a capacity that human beings have and all other 
animals do not. Were we to discover such a capacity, emergence theory might help to 
explain how it could have evolved, but emergence theory does not help with the prior 
task of identification of a distinctively human marker. 
An example may help our appreciation of the difficulty of distinguishing 
between human beings and other species in this way. In 1972 Francine Patterson 
began teaching sign language to a gorilla called Koko. Koko learned to use a 
vocabulary of over 1000 words, and was able to respond in sign language to questions 
asked in English with a receptive vocabulary of several thousand words.28 Some of 
the conversations that have been recorded with Koko are predicable:  
“What do gorillas like to do most?” “Gorilla love eat good.” Or, “What 
makes you happy?” “Gorilla tree.” “What makes you angry?” ‘Work.” “What 
do gorillas do when it’s dark?” “Gorilla listen (pause), sleep.”29 
 Other responses are quite unexpected: 
                                                
27 Arthur Peacocke, ‘Biological Evolution—A Positive Theological Appraisal’, in Evolutionary and 
Molecular Biology: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action, Robert John Russell, William R. Stoeger, 
and Francisco J. Ayala (eds.), (Vatican City State; Berkeley CA: Vatican Observatory and Center for 
Theology and the Natural Sciences, 1998), 358. 
28 Francine Patterson and Wendy Gordon, ‘The Case For The Personhood Of Gorillas’ in Paola 
Cavalieri, and Peter Singer (eds.), The Great Ape Project: Equality Beyond Humanity (New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1993), 58–9. 
29 Patterson and Gordon, ‘Case for the Personhood of Gorillas’, 62. 
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“How did you sleep last night?” (expecting “fine,” “bad”; or some related 
response). “Floor blanket” (Koko sleeps on the floor with blankets). “How do 
you like your blankets to feel?” “Hot Koko-love.” “What happened?” (after an 
earthquake). “Darn darn floor bad bite. Trouble trouble.”30 
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Koko is able to make jokes: the following conversation followed her being shown a 
picture of a bird: 
Koko: That me. (pointing to adult bird) 
Barbara: Is that really you? 
Koko: Koko good bird. 
Barbara: I thought you were a gorilla. 
Koko: Koko bird. 
Barbara: Can you fly? 
Koko: Good. (i.e., yes) 
Barbara: Show me. 
Koko: Fake bird, clown. (Koko laughs) 
Barbara: You're teasing me. (Koko laughs.) What are you really? 
Koko: Gorilla Koko.31 
Perhaps most surprising are the conversations recorded with Koko about death: 
When Koko was seven, one of her teachers asked, “When do gorillas die?” 
and she signed, “Trouble, old.” The teacher also asked, “Where do gorillas go 
when they die?” and Koko replied, “Comfortable hole bye.” When asked 
                                                
30 Patterson and Gordon, ‘Case for the Personhood of Gorillas’, 62. 
31 Patterson and Gordon, ‘Case for the Personhood of Gorillas’, 66. 
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“How do gorillas feel when they die-happy, sad, afraid?” she signed, 
“Sleep”.32 
In 1984 Koko’s favourite kitten, All Ball was run over by a car. When she was told of 
the kitten’s death, Koko cried. Four months later, the following conversation was 
recorded: 
Penny: How did you feel when you lost Ball? 
Koko: Want. 
Penny: How did you feel when you lost him? 
Koko: Open trouble visit sorry. 
Penny: When he died, remember when Ball died, how did you feel? 
Koko: Red red red bad sorry Koko-love good.33 
Recently, a gorilla named Michael, who had been Koko’s companion for 24 years 
died of natural causes. In the following weeks Koko frequently gave mournful cries, 
especially at night, and using sign language asked for the light to be left on when she 
went to bed.34 While Koko’s use of language is exceptional, similar experiments have 
been done with chimpanzees and bonobos35 and other studies have show dolphins to 
be capable of syntactical analysis.36 Sceptics might argue that the behaviours are 
unconsciously cued by the researchers, the conversations recorded could  
 
[top of page 152] 
 
                                                
32 Patterson and Gordon, ‘Case for the Personhood of Gorillas’, 67. 
33 Patterson and Gordon, ‘Case for the Personhood of Gorillas’, 67. 
34 The Gorilla Foundation, ‘Koko’s Mourning for Michael’ (Aug. 2, 2000) at 
http://www.koko.org/world/mourning_koko.html, cited in Adam Kolber,, ‘Standing Upright: The 
Moral and Legal Standing of Humans and Other Apes’, Stanford Law Review 54:1 (2001), 174. 
35 For a survey, see Kolber, ‘Standing Upright’,170–4. 
36 Louis M. Herman, Stan A. Kuczaj, and Mark D. Holder, ‘Responses to Anomalous Gestural 
Sequences By a Language-Trained Dolphin: Evidence for Processing of Semantic Relations and 
Syntactic Information’, Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 122:2 (1993), 184-94. 
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have been selected from a large number that were not considered meaningful, or that 
the apes are merely engaging in behaviour that leads to rewards. However, it is hard 
to discount the range and depth of the evidence that the apes are able to use language 
meaningfully, and hard to avoid the consequent disruption to what we previously 
considered an absolute distinction between human beings and other species.37 
 We have seen, then, that the most frequently offered markers of difference — 
rationality, intelligence, and language — are unable to identify a qualitative difference 
between humans and other creatures. The example of Koko shows why: we have until 
recently substantially understated the capacities of our nearest relatives, the great 
apes. We could multiply discussion of putative distinguishing attributes almost 
indefinitely: we have seen that Brueggemann, for example, suggests that human 
beings have a qualitatively different capacity for relationship with God. Others have 
suggested that only human beings can have autonomy, personhood, morality or 
immorality. Once we have realized the fate of other proposed capacities, however, we 
are properly more sceptical about such loose appeals. It seems very likely that, as in 
the case of language and rationality, we have assumed rather than proved that the 
difference between human beings and other creatures is one of kind rather than 
degree. Until further evidence is adduced, we must accept the provisional conclusion 
that there is no distinctive human capacity that can be used to mark a qualitative 
difference between human beings and other species: as Darwin argued, the difference 
is one of degree. If we want to retain a human-separatist view that humans belong in a 
different theological category from other species, we cannot depend on natural 
attributes for its support. 
                                                
37 As late as 1968 Noam Chomsky was still arguing that Descartes was right that language was a 
‘species-specific human possession’ (Noam Chomsky, Language and Mind (New York: Harcourt 
Brace Jovanovitch, 1968)). 
 14 
 There is a second way we could argue for the human-separatist position, 
however, which is not reliant on identifying a difference in kind between human 
beings and other living creatures. It argues that we do not need a natural difference to 
establish a theological difference. One version of this position is congruent with the 
consensus of Old Testament scholars that the image of God should be understood 
functionally, rather than metaphysically: what is distinctive about human beings is the 
task that God has chosen to assign them. God has made human beings to be God’s 
image on earth: to rule over the other creatures in the same way that the sun and moon 
rule over the day and the night. It is this divine vocation for the human species that 
places them in a theologically different category, independent of arguments about 
their possession of distinctive characteristics. Alternatively, we could use the Barthian 
language of election: there was no qualitative distinction between Abraham and his 
fellow human beings, but through blessing him, God chose to elect  
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the nation of Israel as the people of God. In the same way, we could say that of all the 
creatures, God chose to elect human beings and give them a particular status amidst 
creation. For Barth, this is closely linked to the doctrine of the incarnation: 
Brueggemann states that in the incarnation ‘the creator is “humanized” as the one who 
cares in costly ways for the world’ citing Karl Barth for support.38 Human beings may 
have evolved from other creatures, and therefore stand in a relationship of continuity 
rather than discontinuity with them, but God’s identification of them as God’s image 
on earth, and God’s decision to dignify human beings above all other species through 
                                                
38 Brueggemann, Genesis, 33. 
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the incarnation establishes the qualitative difference demarcating the human that it 
was hard to locate in a comparison of attributes. 
 I have suggested three alternate construals of this second defence of the 
human-separatist position on the basis of vocation, election and the incarnation. In 
relation to vocation based in an interpretation of the image of God, there seems no 
serious theological objection to the view that God has given human beings a particular 
role with respect to the created order. But it seems to me that by itself, the attribution 
of a particular vocation for human beings is insufficient to ground the qualitative 
distinction that the human-separatist position requires. Our task and responsibility 
before God is no doubt particular to the place we find ourselves within God’s 
creation, but the Bible repeatedly affirms that all creation participates in the praise of 
God and each living thing has a part in God’s purposes.39 Paul’s egalitarian vision of 
the diversity of tasks and capacities of the members of the body of Christ (1 Cor 12) 
together with Martin Luther’s affirmation of a wide range of human vocations of 
equal status40 and Jesus’ reinterpretation of lordship as servanthood should give us 
pause before we judge that the vocation God has granted to human beings creates a 
difference in theological status between them and the rest of the creation. The 
vocation given by God to human beings denotes particularity rather than separation 
from other species. 
 If we were to picture God’s action in making human beings in God’s image as 
election, however, we would certainly succeed in making the human-separatist case. 
Through its election by God, Israel is separated from the other nations and given a 
particular privilege and status. While its election may be to bring light to all nations 
                                                
39 See, for example, Psalm 148, God’s speech to Job, chs 38–41, or Paul’s evocation of the whole of 
creation groaning for redemption in Romans 8. 
40 For a survey of this topic in Luther’s thought, see Paul Althaus, The Ethics of Martin Luther, trans. 
Robert C. Schultz (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1972), 36–42. 
 16 
(Isa 51:4), God’s election sets it apart and places it in a unique relationship with God 
that is a good parallel with the special relationship Brueggemann pictures between 
God and humankind. The difficulty with this argument is that we have no biblical or 
other grounds for believing that God has elected human beings to a particular status 
that makes them qualitatively different in theological terms to other living creatures.  
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Brueggemann’s arguments are based on Barth’s affirmations about the particular 
dignity of the human, which are in turn based on his interpretation of doctrine of the 
incarnation. The argument for the human-separatist view on the basis of God’s 
election of human beings therefore stands or falls with the argument from the 
incarnation, to which I now turn. 
 One of the central tenets of Barth’s theological project is the affirmation that 
God is ‘for’ human beings. Barth echoes Calvin’s judgement in affirming that ‘the 
universe is created as a theatre for God’s dealings with man and man’s dealings with 
God’.41 For Barth all Christian theology must be understood through the person of 
Jesus Christ and creation is merely the external basis of the covenant of grace God 
establishes through Christ with human beings.42 In Christ, ‘God is human’.43 It is hard 
to envisage a higher or more absolute distinction that could be established between 
human beings and the rest of creation. Put this way, the qualitative theological 
                                                
41 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, vol. II/2, trans. G. W. Bromiley et al. (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 
1957), 94. 
42 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, vol. III/1, trans. J. W. Edwards, O. Bussey, and Harold Knight 
(Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1958), 94–228. 
43 Karl Barth, The Humanity of God, trans. Thomas Wieser and John Newton (Richmond, Virginia: 
John Knox Press, 1960), 51. 
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distinction between human beings and all other living things seems glaringly and 
blindingly obvious.  
There is, however, no theological necessity in construing God’s purposes in 
creation and the meaning of the incarnation in the way Barth does, and good reasons 
to doubt his judgement. In relation to his assertion that human beings were God’s sole 
end in creating the universe, we must recognize that there are no biblical or other 
reasons for narrowing God’s purposes in the creation and redemption of the universe 
merely to the human. As we have seen, this seemed obvious to Philo and Calvin, and 
they are in the company of a great many others, but there are significant biblical 
elements that stand in the way of such a narrow interpretation of God’s intentions in 
creation and redemption. In Genesis 1, God pronounces what he makes on each day 
good with no reference to its fitness for human purposes, and assigns to human beings 
the task of governing the rest of the created order, rather than becoming spectators, 
consumers or disposers of it. God’s speech to Job reminds him of the 
incomprehensible diversity of creation, including elements such as Behemoth and 
Leviathan whose existence is a threat to humankind, rather than a service to it (Job 
38–41). In the New Testament, in his letters to the Corinthians and Colossians, Paul 
affirms the significance of God’s redemptive work for the whole of creation.44 
Barth’s argument that the incarnation represents God’s privileging of the 
human, seems persuasive until we reflect on attempts earlier in the Christian tradition 
to particularize the significance of the incarnation. The Acts of the Apostles narrates a 
dispute between those among the first Christians who thought that Gentiles must 
conform to Jewish law to become members of the church, and those who thought that 
                                                
44 Rom. 8: 19–23; Col. 1: 15–20. See below for a further discussion of these texts as they impact on 
interpretation of the incarnation. 
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the Gentiles should be admitted without precondition, in fulfilment of prophecies that 
foretold that all peoples  
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would come to worship the Lord (Acts 15). If the church had chosen the former 
position, it would have decided in effect that the best description of the incarnation 
was that God became a Jew; instead its decision resulted in the declaration at the 
Council of Nicaea that God became human. The church therefore broadened its 
understanding of God’s incarnation in Jesus Christ from Jewish human to human. 
Arguably, however, the church did not fully appreciate the significance of its 
affirmation at Nicaea: one way of understanding the struggle of women in the church 
in the intervening 1700 years is that the church was frequently operating on the 
understanding that in Jesus Christ God became a male human being.45 The past 
century has seen a debate in some ways similar to the one that preceded the admission 
of the Gentiles: the discussion of whether women can participate in the church as 
women on equal terms with men. In parallel with the Gentile case, we can restate the 
case for equality as the assertion that the best understanding of the incarnation is to 
avoid particularizing the maleness of Christ and instead opt for an inclusive rendering, 
deliberately affirming for the first time that in Christ God became simply human.  
These examples make clear that the boundaries demarcating the significance 
of the incarnation have been contested in the Christian tradition, and have had to be 
redrawn in order to reflect a sufficiently inclusive understanding of God’s purposes. If 
it is the case that the church has been led to progressively broader understandings of 
                                                
45 The classic statement of this concern is Rosemary Radford Ruether’s chapter ‘Can a Male Savior 
Save Women?’ in Sexism and God-Talk: Towards a Feminist Theology (London: SCM, 2002), 116–38. 
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the significance of the incarnation, it seems to me that the doctrine of the incarnation 
need not demarcate an absolute distinction between human beings and the rest of 
creation. If we have widened our understanding from God becoming a Jewish male 
human, to male human, to human, there seems no barrier to broadening our view one 
step further in claiming that the incarnation is best understood as God becoming a 
creature. In fact, this is less of an innovation than it seems: in Paul’s letter to the 
Colossians he links the creation of all things in Christ, the holding together of all 
things in Christ, and the reconciling of all things in Christ through the cross (Col 
1:13–20), pointing to an understanding of the incarnation as Christ becoming a 
representative of ‘all things’. Similarly, if we recognize with Paul in Romans 8 that 
not just human beings but the whole of creation is groaning in need of God’s 
redemption, and we also take account of Gregory of Nazianzus’s famous dictum 
about the incarnation that what Christ did not assume, he did not heal,46 then we are in 
urgent need of an understanding of the incarnation that sees it as fundamentally the 
assumption of creation by its creator. If this is the case, however, we no longer have 
grounds for using the incarnation to demarcate an absolute distinction between human 
beings and other creatures. 
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Conclusion: against human-separatism 
I have argued that Christian readings of Genesis 1 remain pre-Darwinian, in taking a 
human-separatist view that posits a qualitative theological difference between human 
beings and other species of living things. I identified two arguments supporting a 
                                                
46 Gregory of Nazianzus, Letter 101, Nicene and Post Nicene Fathers, Series 2, vol. 7 (Edinburgh: T & 
T Clark, 1989), 440. 
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human-separatist view in an evolutionary context. The first was that human beings 
have evolved so far beyond other species as to constitute a new category of living 
thing supporting a theological judgement of a difference in kind, and I argued in 
response that recent studies of great apes have shown the truth of Darwin’s judgement 
that the difference between human beings and other creatures is of degree only. The 
second argument I considered was that there is a theological basis for a discontinuity 
between human beings and other species, irrespective of their respective attributes. 
The candidates for this theological basis I considered here were the functional 
interpretation of the image of God as task and vocation, the idea that God has elected 
the human species, and the doctrine of the incarnation. I agreed that God assigns 
human beings a particular task by God, but suggested that this was insufficient to 
ground the claim that they had become qualitatively different from other creatures as 
a result. I showed that the concept of human election was dependent on the 
incarnation, and finally I argued that the doctrine of the incarnation need not and 
should not be interpreted in such a way as to establish a discontinuity between human 
beings and other creatures. 
My argument therefore is that the human-separatist view that posits a 
qualitative theological distinction between human beings and other species is 
incompatible with the belief that human beings evolved from other animals. Such a 
view remains pre-Darwinian in its reading of Genesis, and fails to appreciate the full 
consequences of what the Darwinian revolution means for Christian theology. We 
therefore stand in need of a reading of Genesis that fully recognizes the relationship 
of continuity between human beings and other creatures. In closing, I want to identify 
briefly three key implications of this conclusion. 
 21 
First, I do not believe that to recognize that the work of Darwin demands a 
new reading of Genesis is necessarily to allow scientific understandings to determine 
theological conclusions. When Christians were first challenged by those inside and 
outside the church affirming the equality of women, they engaged in a reappraisal of 
their readings of scripture and the outworking of it in the Christian tradition. They 
decided that texts such as Gen 1:27 and Gal 3:28 could be read as affirming the 
equality of women and men. As a result, after significant and lengthy internal debates, 
many churches 
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recognized that the internal and external challenges were in harmony with a strand 
already present in the Christian tradition that had previously received inadequate 
attention. This was not a case, therefore, merely of secular ideals forcing a theological 
accommodation, but of Christians hearing a prophetic voice alerting them to the need 
to reappraise what they had received. In the case of slavery, the challenge was similar, 
though some Christians were quicker to recognize that the internal logic of their faith 
commitments necessitated moral and political change. I suggest that Darwin’s theory 
of evolution is a similar prophetic calling to the church to revisit and re-evaluate its 
theological heritage, and recognize that continuity between human beings and other 
creatures is deeply embedded in biblical teaching and the Christian tradition. It is the 
affirmation of God as creator of all things which makes clearest the essential 
relationship between all God’s creatures, and I have already indicated key parts of the 
biblical witness that strongly affirm this view. 
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If it were a theological necessity to affirm human-separatism we would be 
faced with an unwelcome choice between creationism — as the only way to under 
gird theological affirmations that human beings are a different kind of creature — and 
atheistic Darwinism. Happily, this is not the case. Just as Christianity came to realize 
in a post-Copernican context that displacing the planet earth from the centre of the 
solar system need not mean discarding Genesis 1 from the scriptural canon, so we in a 
post-Darwinian context must realize that displacing human beings from a separate 
theological category of creature can prompt us to better readings of the Genesis 
creation narrative. 
Second, however, I do not want to understate the theological challenge of 
moving beyond the human-separatist position that I have argued is unsustainable. For 
me this is exemplified most clearly in the words of Psalm 8 that claim God has made 
human beings a little lower than God and put all things under their feet (vv. 5–6). This 
assertion of the human-separatist view has strong affinities with Genesis 1 and 
alongside other texts will clearly have to be read differently if I am right that this 
position is untenable. My initial proposal here is that we recognize that these and 
similar texts are proclamations of good news to God’s people in exile, desperately in 
need of reassurance that God remains God and that God values human beings and will 
not abandon them. Brueggemann makes this point with respect to Genesis 1, and it is 
instructive that the verses I have cited from Psalm 8 follow the psalmist’s pondering 
of the majesty of God’s creation and questioning why human beings should have any 
significance from a divine point of view. In his commentary on Genesis, Calvin 
quickly discounts apparent challenges from contemporary scientific views that 
recognize the moon merely reflects the sun’s light, and in any case is very much 
smaller than Saturn, which is not mentioned at all. He  
 23 
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says that Genesis is an account of what is visible, and does not attempt ‘to soar above 
the heavens’.47 Where Brueggemann pictures Genesis as good news for exiles, Calvin 
therefore sees Genesis 1 as telling the story of the creation of the universe from a 
human point of view. 
Now in relation to this point we could quickly respond that we can never 
obtain any other point of view than the human, but it might be that telling the human 
story in particular ways has significant and negative consequences for our 
appreciation of other parts of God’s creation. The twelfth century Jewish thinker 
Moses Maimonides is interesting on this point. In contradiction to the Jewish tradition 
and his earlier views, which both followed Philo in seeing human beings as the end of 
creation, Maimonides insisted that God intended all creatures for their own sake. He 
illustrates his point in this way: to think that the world was created for humankind is 
like a man in a city thinking that the final end of the city’s ruler is to keep his house 
safe at night: from his point of view it looks like this, but once we have seen the 
bigger picture the man’s view is obviously ridiculous.48 My sense is that some of the 
texts and traditions we have received are understandably concerned to render the 
world theologically intelligible to human beings and announce to them the good news 
that they are of infinite importance to their creator. In the light of what Darwin has 
taught us, however, it is necessary for us to recognize that God’s purposes are not 
exhausted in the creation and redemption of human beings: just as there are other 
citizens in the city in Maimonides’s parable, so there are other creatures as well over 
                                                
47 Calvin, Genesis, 85. 
48 Moses Maimonides, The Guide of the Perplexed , trans. Shlomo Pines (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1963), 3:13. 
 24 
whom God’s providential care also extends. It is this change of perspective, very 
much akin to that God demanded of Job, which will guide the hermeneutical and 
theological innovations we need to make in response to a rediscovery of our solidarity 
with God’s other creatures. 
Third, we need to recognize that rereading Genesis 1 in the way I am 
proposing will have implications for our practice as well as our doctrine. It cannot be 
otherwise: if we take the view that God’s sole aim in creating the universe was the 
redemption of human beings, we will have justification for using all parts of creation 
for whatever we need and want as Calvin recommends. If we take the human-
separatist view, we will place human beings in a different moral category from other 
creatures to match their qualitative theological difference, and therefore appropriately 
give far less regard to the well-being of non-human creatures. If we reject these 
doctrinal views, we will need to rethink our ethics, too. Even given his view that the 
universe was established for human beings, Barth saw the killing of animals as 
‘something which is at least very similar to homicide’ and which is legitimate only 
under the pressure of necessity.49 Once we have departed from Barth in recognizing  
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our decisive solidarity with all God’s creatures in creation and redemption, we will 
have to ask even more seriously concerning our responsibilities to our fellow 
creatures. 
                                                
49 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, vol. III/4, trans. A. T. MacKay et al. (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 
1961), 350–5. 
